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1. 762 N.E.2d 1205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
2. A sunshine law is a statute requiring a governmental department or agency to open its meetings or
its records to public access.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1450 (7th ed. 1999).  Illinois’ Sunshine Laws
are commonly referred to as the Illinois Open Meetings Act.  5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1–6 (2002). 
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The July heat pounds down on the parking lot of the building
where the township board is having their monthly meeting.  The clock
strikes 9 p.m. as the five board members sitting around the table finally
work their way down to the bottom of the agenda.  The board
supervisor, as chairman of trustees, cautiously asks, “Is there any New
Business?”  Knowing the answer, the chairman looks into the audience
where about fifty people from the town have gathered.  One of the less
shy female members of crowd stands up and declares, “We don’t want
that West Nile Virus that is spreading around. There is too much
standing water in our township and that leads to too many of those little
mosquitoes that carry that deadly disease.  We want you guys to vote
that the township should be sprayed for mosquitoes now before we all
get sick and die.”  The chairman reluctantly stands up and explains,
“Miss, we can’t take any action on anything that wasn’t specifically
named in the agenda.  We would be happy to discuss the matter, but we
can’t order the spraying of the township until it has been voted on at
either our next meeting or until we have a special meeting.”
Decided in January 2002, Rice v. Board of Trustees1 provides the
reason why the township board could not take action on the mosquito
problem that night.  In a case of first impression in Illinois, the Fourth
District of Illinois ruled that Illinois’ Sunshine Laws2 prohibit public
bodies in Illinois from taking action at their meetings on any matter not
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3. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
4. Id. (holding “the consideration of” items not specifically set forth in the agenda to be in the nature of
deliberations and discussion and not actions taken); 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (1998).
5. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
6. This Casenote is current as of 2003.
specifically named in the posted agenda for that meeting.3  Defining
section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act’s use of the word
“consideration,” Rice held the Act permitted only discussion of new
topics at public  meetings, but not action upon those new items.4  In
addition, the court found that the agenda item, New Business, did not
allow for enough advance notice to the public.5  Although the result
rendered in Rice could be achieved by a narrow process of statutory
interpretation, if the court had analyzed those same principles of
statutory interpretation in a broader sense and applied other factors
such as public business efficiency, substantial compliance with the
Illinois Open Meetings Act, and future problems, a more reasoned and
appropriate outcome could have been achieved by the Rice court ruling
that “consideration” should include taking action and the agenda item,
New Business, does provide enough advance notice to the public.
Part II of this note examines a brief history of the development of
the law leading up to Rice.  First, a summary of the major requirements
of the current Illinois Open Meetings Act is presented.6  Second, prior
case law illustrating the evolution to Rice, is reviewed.  Finally, the
1995 amendment to the Illinois Open Meetings Act, which added the
language that came to be part of the controversy in Rice, is discussed.
Part III of this note will outline the underlying facts, decision, and
rationale behind Rice.  
Part IV of this note will provide an analysis of the decision in Rice.
First, statutory interpretation principles will be applied to the Illinois
Open Meetings Act to examine how the court reached its decision in
Rice.  It will demonstrate how the facts in Rice could have just as easily
favored the defendants by looking to the concepts of (1) statutory
interpretation from a different viewpoint,  (2) good business, and (3)
substantial compliance with the Illinois Open Meetings Act.  Finally,
potential problems resulting from the ruling in Rice will be addressed
with attempts to answer these lingering questions.  
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7. Mathias W. Delort, Let the Sunshine In: The New Illinois Open Meetings Act , 9 CHI. B. ASS’N.  REC.,
May 1995, at 42.
8. Id. 
9. Id.
10. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 120/1–6 (West 1993 & Supp. 2003).
11. Id. § 2.
12. Id. § 2.01.
13. Id. § 2.02; Rice v. Board of Trustees, 762 N.E.2d at 1205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
14. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. ANN. 120/2.03.
15. Id. § 2.05.
16. Id. § 2.06.
17. Id. § 2a.
18. Id. § 4.
II.  BACKGROUND
A.  Requirements of the Current Illinois Open Meetings Act
Elected officials across the state of Illinois are probably the most
likely people to have a general sense of what the Illinois Open
Meetings Act is all about.7  This is true because elected officials are the
people who have to deal with the procedures of meetings governed by
the Illinois Open Meetings Act.8  The Illinois Open Meetings Act
regulates how the governing boards of the state’s municipalities,
counties, public school districts, and townships all make political and
legislative decisions.9  
As of 2003, the Illinois Open Meetings Act is divided into sixteen
different sections and subsections.10  As the crux of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act, section 2 outlines the broad requirement that “[a]ll
meetings of public  bodies shall be open to the public.”11  Section 2.01
states that all meetings “shall be held at specified times and places
which are convenient and open to the public.”12  Section 2.02 describes
the notice requirement which is at issue in Rice.13  Public bodies shall
“prepare and make available a schedule of all [their] regular meetings”
according to section 2.03.14  Section 2.05 makes clear that “any person
may record the proceedings at meetings required to be open by this Act
by tape, film or other means.”15  Section 2.06 says that “[a]ll public
bodies shall keep written minutes of all their meetings, whether open
or closed.”16  Guidelines for a closed meeting are outlined in section
2a.17  Section 4 describes the possible penalty for violating any
provision of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.18
178 Southern Illinois University Law Journal [Vol. 28
19. Id. §§ 1–6.
20. 357 N.E.2d 458 (Ill. 1976); accord Menssen v. Eureka Unit Dist. No. 140, 388 N.E.2d 273, 276 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979) (holding that an agenda was not required for public notice).
21. 516 N.E.2d 834 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
22. 606 N.E.2d 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
23. Allen, 357 N.E.2d at 462; Argo, 516 N.E.2d at 836; Redell, 606 N.E.2d at 131.
24. Allen, 357 N.E.2d at 460.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
B.  The Road to Rice v. Board of Trustees
Since the inception of the Illinois Open Meetings Act in 1957,
Illinois courts have ruled in a wide variety of directions on the subject
of public  notice.19  Three cases, Allen v. Cook County,20 Argo High School
Council v. Argo Community High School Dist. 217,21 and People ex rel. Redell
v. Giglio,22 point out the confusion attorneys faced even before Rice.
Each case paints a picture of the transition:  from Allen, where public
notice was not required; to Argo, where partial notice was required; to
Redell, which required a higher level of public  notice. 23  This
incongruent view of the courts in Illinois is what likely led to the
court’s attempt to shed some light on the issue in Rice.
In Allen, a meeting of the Board of Commissioners of Cook
County was held on October 20, 1975.24  The Board adopted Ordinance
No. 75–0–33, appropriating $2 million from the motor fuel tax fund to
the Regional Transportation Authority.25  One member of the Board
challenged the announcement and “stated that the appropriation
measure required a two-thirds vote of the members elected to the
Board.”26  As a result, Ordinance No. 75–0–34, which in pertinent part
provided:  “[n]o money shall be appropriated or ordered paid by said
county commissioners beyond the sum of $5,000.00, unless such
appropriation shall have been authorized by a vote of a majority of the
members elected to said county board” was voted on and passed by the
Board.27  Ordinance No. 75–0–33, appropriating money to the Regional
Transportation Authority, was then voted on again and passed under
the newly amended majority vote standard.28
On January 29, 1976, the plaintiff, John T. Allen, Jr., filed a claim
against the defendants, the County of Cook, George W. Dunne,
president of the Board of Commissioners of Cook County; and the
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29. Id. at 459.
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 462.
32. Id. 
33. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (1985); Argo High School Council v. Argo Community High School
Dist. 217, 516 N.E.2d 834, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
34. Argo, 516 N.E.2d at 834.
35. Id. at 834–35.
36. Id. at 835.
37. Id. 
other fourteen incumbent members of the Board.29  The plaintiff sought
a declaratory judgment that Cook County Ordinance No. 75–0–34,
enacted on October 20, 1975, was invalid.30  Among other reasons, the
plaintiff argued the ordinance did not comply with the notice
requirement of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.31  The Supreme Court
of Illinois denied the motion, holding “[n]othing in the Open Meetings
Act required that notice be given that the proposed ordinance would be
presented for adoption at that meeting.  The public and suburban
members had knowledge of the time and place of the meeting, and the
meeting was ‘open’ within the meaning of the Act.”32
The pertinent issue in Argo involved an interpretation of the
language of section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, which
read “the validity of any action taken by the public body which is
germane to a subject on the agenda shall not be affected by other errors
or omissions in the agenda.”33  On November 7, 1985, the secretary of
the Argo Community High School District 217 board posted and
published notice of a meeting to be held on November 11, 1985.34  The
agenda stated the meeting would cover “[r]eview and discussion of
salaries involving administrators, supervisors and other personnel not
covered by agreements.”35  However, at the meeting, the Argo
Community High School board adopted certain motions providing the
following: (1) extension of the superintendent's contract for one year
through the 1986–1987 school year; (2) a change in the appointment of
department chairpersons from a permanent basis to a three–year
rotational basis; and (3) the posting and receiving of applications for
the position of Athletic Director for the 1986–1987 school year.36  
On December 26, 1985, Argo High School Council of Local 571
filed a complaint against the high school stating the November meeting
violated the notice requirements of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.37
The union sought a declaratory ruling making the actions of the
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38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 837.
41. Id. at 836 (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY  618 (5th ed. 1979)).
42. Id. at 837; 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (1985).
43. People ex rel. Redell v. Giglio, 606 N.E.2d at 128 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a)
(1991).
44. Redell, 606 N.E.2d at 129.
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 130.
47. Id.
48. Id.
November meeting void.38  The trial court rejected the union’s
complaint ruling that notice did take place, which led to the appeal in
this case.39  
Referring to the language of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, the
Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois affirmed the trial
court’s decision because the proceedings that took place at the board’s
November meeting were germane enough to the items listed on the
agenda.40  Germane is defined as appropriate, relative, or in close
relationship.41  Interpreting the language of section 2.02(a) of the Open
Meetings Act rather broadly, the court decided that discussions of who
can authorize salary increases, who will receive a salary, and the length
of the superintendent's contract are closely related enough, or germane
to, “a discussion of salaries of personnel not covered by agreements.”42
Conversely, in Redell, the court applied the wording of section
2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act a little more narrowly. 43  On
October 22, 1991, Charles Palombo resigned his position as trustee on
the Board of Trustees of Thornton Township.44  On December 17,
1991, the Board held a special board meeting.45  The agenda for the
meeting consisted of five items.46  Items one, two and four involved
financial matters, item five referred to the rescheduling of a regular
meeting, and item three stated: “‘[a]ny other matters or problems
related to the Redell/Poindexter abandonment of their responsibilities
as supervisor and trustee affecting Thornton Township regarding
personnel, finance, programs, general fund, general assistance fund,
paratransit, road and bridge fund, and all other matters pertaining to the
function of the township.’”47  Frederick Redell was the Supervisor of
the Board of Trustees of Thornton Township and Catherine Poindexter
was a trustee.48  At the meeting, a motion was made to vote in Tina
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49. Id. at 129–30.
50. Id. at 130.
51. Id. 
52. Id.
53. Id. at 131.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Bigham v. Rock Island, 256 N.E.2d 897, 898 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970).
57. Delort, supra note 7, at 42.
58. Id.; James Tidwell, An Open Meetings Act Primer , 83 ILL. B.J. 593, 593 (1995).
Paterek as trustee for the board, which was approved by everyone
except Redell and Poindexter.49
Subsequently, on December 23, 1991, Paterek filed a claim
seeking declaratory judgment that she was a lawfully appointed
member of the board.50  Redell filed his answer and affirmative
defenses to Paterek's claim “alleging the action taken at the meeting on
December 17, 1991, to elect Paterek to the board, was illegal because
it was not within the scope of the agenda” and therefore violated the
Open Meetings Act.51  On March 23, 1992, the trial court sided with
Redell.52
After referencing the wording on the meeting’s agenda, the
Appellate Court for the First District of Illinois affirmed the trial
court.53  Finding Paterek's appointment was intended to fill the position
vacated by Palombo, the court saw no connection between that position
and the positions occupied by Redell and Poindexter, nor did it find any
action on their part which had an impact on the township.54  In addition,
the court determined the phrase, “‘and all other matters pertaining to
the function of the Township,’” to be overly all-inclusive and did not
give any notice to the public of Paterek’s possible appointment to the
vacant board seat.55
C.  The 1995 Amendment to the Illinois Open Meetings Act
The Illinois legislature enacted the public notice requirement of
the Illinois Open Meetings Act into law in July 1967.56  The regulations
set forth in the Illinois Open Meetings Act are fairly stringent.57
However, some individuals obviously did not believe they were
stringent enough.  In the early 90’s, a group represented by the Illinois
Press Association negotiated with elected local officials, led by the
Illinois Municipal League, to provide more openness in the process of
the deliberation of public business.58  The compromise that came about
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59. H.R. 1332, 88th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 1995).
60. Delort, supra note 7, at 42.
61. Id.; 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (2002).
62. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (2002).
63. Id.; Delort, supra note 7, at 42.
64. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (2002).
65. Rice v. Board of Trustees, 762 N.E.2d at 1205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
66. House of Representatives Transcript of the Debate on H.B. 1332, State of Illinois 88th GENERAL
ASSEMBLY 56 (Apr. 20, 1993) (statement of Rep. Currie).
67. Delort, supra note 7, at 42.
68. Id.
69. Id.
as a result was House Bill 1332,59  which was passed by both houses
and signed into law as Public Act 88–621 by Governor Jim Edgar in
September of 1994.60
Public  Act 88–621 made three significant changes to the structure
of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.61  First, the legislature amended the
Act to require public  notice 48 hours prior to a meeting, a change from
the previous 24-hour requirement.62  Second, the Act required public
bodies to post an agenda for each regular meeting at least 48 hours in
advance.63  In addition, it provided that the agenda requirement no
longer precluded consideration of other items not in the agenda.64 
This last change was at issue in Rice.65  It seemed like a pretty
straightforward addition to the statute.  After all, during the third
reading of House Bill 1332 on April 20, 1993, Representative Currie
did mention one of its purposes was to clarify the previous wording of
the Illinois Open Meetings Act.66  However, from its enactment in
1995, the amendment has caused confusion as to whether
“consideration” meant elected officials at a meeting could vote on
something not set forth in the posted agenda. 
In May 1995, the Chicago Bar Association published an article
addressing this controversy.67  It concluded that items not posted on the
agenda could still be acted upon, stating the new agenda requirement
for regular meetings led to concerns that elected officials could not
bring up new issues during meetings, or that citizens could not raise
new matters and request action on them.68  “‘However, the law
specifies that failure to include a matter on a regular meeting agenda
does not invalidate any action taken on the item.’”69
The 1996 Summer Survey Edition of the Southern Illinois
University Law Journal addressed the requirement that the agenda now
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70. Michael J. Maslanka et al., Survey of Illinois Law: Administrative Law, 20 S. ILL. U.  L.J. 667, 692
(1996).
71. Id.
72. Helen W. Gunnarsson, A Sizzling Rice Soup for Public Officials?, 90 ILL. B.J. 226, 230 (2002).
73. Id.
74. Rice v. Board of Trustees, 762 N.E.2d at 1205 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
75. Id. at 1206.
76. Id.; 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1–6 (1998).
77. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1206; see also 40 ILL. COMP . STAT. 5/7–145.1 (1998).
must be posted at every regular meeting. 70  The author stated, “[t]his
requirement, however, does not prohibit discussion of issues not on the
agenda.”71  Since nothing was said in the article about “acting” on an
item not on the agenda, it seems the writer of this article likely believed
only “discussion” could occur on items not on the agenda.
In the May 2002 Law Pulse edition of the Illinois Bar Journal author
Helen W. Gunnarsson wrote about the Illinois Open Meetings Act
notice requirement.72  Illinois State Bar Association member, Phillip
Lenzini, whose practice involves advising many local government units
all over Illinois, was quoted as saying that until recently “many
attorneys and local government bodies had taken the agenda
requirement fairly casually, believing that the language of section
2.02(a) transformed the statutory requirement of having an agenda into
a mere formality.”73  This was the common belief until January 24,
2002.  Then the Rice ruling was issued, which attempted to lessen the
vagueness of the Illinois Open Meetings Act notice requirement.74
However, the true result has been more confusion and shock
permeating throughout Illinois’ legal community because of the agenda
requirement suddenly changing from a helpful tool to an essential
necessity.  
III.  EXPOSITION OF THE CASE
On January 7, 1999, Bruce A. Rice filed a complaint against the
defendants, the Board of Trustees of Adams County, Illinois and the
County of Adams, Illinois.75  The amended complaint of May 18, 1999,
alleged a failure by the Board to comply with the Illinois Open
Meetings Act.76  The Board had adopted a resolution providing for an
alternative benefit program for elected county officers pursuant to
section 7–145.1 of the Illinois Pension Code.77  Both plaintiff and
defendants filed for summary judgment, and on May 10, 2000, the trial
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78. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1206.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. 
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (1998); Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1206.
89. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the
actions of the Board in adopting the resolution null and void.78  The
defendants moved for reconsideration, and the trial court entered an
order denying this motion on March 16, 2001.79  The defendants then
appealed the grant of summary judgment for plaintiff, and the
Appellate Court for the Fourth District of Illinois affirmed the trial
court’s decision.80  
The agenda of the County Board’s November 10, 1998, meeting
included thirty-four items, twenty-five of which were reports by
various people.81  Item number 32 was entitled New Business.82  Nearly
identical agendas were found for meetings dated September 8, 1998,
and October 13, 1998.83  The minutes of the November 10 meeting
reflected that when the meeting got down to New Business on the
agenda, a Mr. Heidbreder stated, “there is another resolution to
present.”84  The resolution dealing with the alternative benefit program
for elected county officials pursuant to section 7–145.1 of the Illinois
Pension Code was read aloud, and Mr. Heidbreder made a motion to
adopt the resolution.85  The County Board discussed the resolution and
the motion passed.86  
The defendants admitted that the alternative benefit program for
elected county officials was not specifically added to the agenda before
the meeting.87  However, the defendants argued that section 2.02(a) of
the Illinois Open Meetings Act, which provides that the “requirement
of a regular meeting agenda shall not preclude the consideration of
items not specifically set forth in the agenda,” should sway the court in
their favor.88  The defendants also argued that, because the elected
county officers who chose to partic ipate in the alternative benefit
program were not made parties to the suit, these officers were not
bound by the judgment declaring the actions of the Board, in adopting
the resolution, null and void.89  The Appellate Court for the Fourth
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90. Id. at 1206.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 723 N.E.2d 256 (Ill. 1999).
95. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1–6 (1998); Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
96. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207 (citing Highlands, 723 N.E.2d at 263).
97. Id. (citing 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1 (1998)).
98. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1 (1998); Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
99. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1 (1998); Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
District of Illinois disagreed with the defendants’ reasoning on both
arguments.90
The appellate court started its analysis of the issues by first
expressing that the entry of summary judgment is appropriate where no
questions of fact are present and judgment can be made as a matter of
law.91  The court then reasoned since the case involved statutory
interpretation and statutory interpretation is a matter of law, summary
judgment was a possible verdict by the trial court.92  Appellate courts
review a summary judgment decision de novo.93
Referencing County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands94 and the
language of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, the court concluded that
the term “consideration” did not mean action could be taken on an
issue at a meeting.95  The court pronounced the “fundamental rule of
statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the
legislature.  A court first looks to the words of the statute.  The
language of the statute is the best indication of the legislative intent.”96
Section 1 of the Illinois Open Meetings Act states:
In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds
and declares that it is  the intent of this  Act to ensure that the actions of
public bodies be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted
openly.  The General Assembly further declares it to be the public
policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice of
and the right to attend all meetings at which any business of a public
body is discussed or acted upon in any way.97  
The court noted the Illinois Open Meetings Act speaks of “actions
of public  bodies” in a separate way from “their deliberations.”98  Also,
the Act speaks of “business of a public  body” being “discussed” in
addition to “acted upon.”99  
The court found the item, New Business, did not provide enough
advance notice to the public of a resolution providing for an alternative
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100. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. 
benefit program for elected county officers.100  In addition, it noted in
the minutes of the November 10, 1998  meeting the item had already
been discussed years ago, contrary to the Board’s assertion that the
resolution was “new” business.101 Finally, in response to the
defendants’ argument that the elected county officers were not bound
by the judgment of the trial court because they were not made parties
to the suit, without providing any justification, the court stated the
pension rights of the defendants no longer had any “force, binding
power, or validity.”102
IV.  ANALYSIS
The result handed down in Rice could be achieved by a narrow
process of statutory interpretation.  However, if the court had analyzed
those same principles of statutory interpretation in a broader sense and
applied other factors such as public business efficiency, substantial
compliance with the Illinois Open Meetings Act, and future problems,
a more reasoned and appropriate outcome could have been achieved.
A proper ruling by the Rice court would have stated that
“consideration” should include taking action and the agenda item, New
Business, does provide enough advance notice to the public.
A.  Statutory Interpretation of Section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act
1.  The Definition of “Consideration”
The Rice court ruled on two issues.103  First, the Rice court had to
give a meaning to the word “consideration” in the context of section
2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.104  Section 2.02(a) of the
Illinois Open Meetings Act provides that the “requirement of a regular
meeting agenda shall not preclude the consideration of items not
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105. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/2.02(a) (1998). The text of this section provides:
(a) Every public body shall give public notice of the schedule of regular meetings at
the beginning of each calendar or fiscal year and shall state the regular dates, times,
and places of such meetings.  An agenda for each regular meeting shall be posted at
the principal office of the public body and at the location where the meeting is to be
held at least 48 hours in advance of the holding of the meeting.  The requirement of
a regular meeting agenda shall not preclude the consideration of items not
specifically set forth in the agenda.
Id. (emphasis added).
106. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
107. Id. (citing County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. Highlands, 723 N.E.2d 256, 263 (Ill. 1999)); see also
People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger, 332 N.E.2d 649, 658 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
108. People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr, 414 N.E.2d 731, 738 (Ill. 1980).
109. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1206.
110. Id. at 1207.
111. Id. at 1206.
112. Id. at 1207.
113. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1 (1998). Section 1 states:
In order that the people shall be informed, the General Assembly finds and declares that it
is the intent of this Act to ensure that the actions of public bodies  be taken openly and that
their deliberat ions  be conducted openly.  The General Assembly further declares it to be
the public policy of this State that its citizens shall be given advance notice of and the right
to attend all meetings at  which any business of a public body is discussed or acted upon in
any way.
Id. (emphasis added).
114. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207; 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1 (1998).
specifically set forth in the agenda.”105  The court then had to decide
whether the agenda item, New Business, was detailed enough in order to
give notice to the public.106  Citing Highlands, the court properly stated
the “fundamental rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the
intention of the legislature.”107  The Open Meetings Act is intended to
create a functional means of opening the deliberative processes of
government to public  view.108  The Rice court noted, “[i]t is the intent
of the Act to protect the citizen’s right to know.”109  
The issue is whether the term “consideration” should mean “taking
action” or just “discussion.”110  The defendants in Rice wanted to give
“consideration” a definition that would allow for action on an item not
mentioned in the agenda. 111  However, the court took the opposite view
that “consideration” was limited only to deliberation and discussion.112
Section 1 of Illinois’ Sunshine Laws states the legislative intent.113  The
court noticed that in this section the legislature spoke of “actions of
public  bodies” separate from “their deliberations,” and business
“discussed” separate from business “acted upon.”114  Most likely trying
to avoid surplusage, the court implied that these groupings of words
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115. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
116. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1457 (7th ed. 1999).
117. Id.
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119. See Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
120. Id.; BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (7th ed. 1999).
121. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1084 (7th ed. 1999).
122. 5 ILL. COMP . STAT. 120/1 (1998).
123. Rice, 762 N.E.2d at 1207.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Fitzsimmons v. Norgle, 472 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ill. 1984); People v. Brown, 442 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ill.
1982) (These cases illustrate Illinois courts’ deference toward the plain-meaning rule.).
should be put into two categories.115 Surplusage is defined as
“[r]edundant words in a statute or other drafted document.”116  The rule
against surplusage reasons that the legislature put every word in the
statute for a reason.117  Consequently, no two terms in a statute would
mean the same thing at the same time.118  When the court tries to avoid
surplusage by dividing these words in section 1 into two categories of
discussion and action, it is in reality giving effect to every word of the
statute.119  
Another device the court in Rice might have used to separate the
two sets of words is  noscitur a sociis.120  Noscitur a sociis is a canon of
construction meaning “an unclear word or phrase should be determined
by the words immediately surrounding it.”121  Section 1 of the Illinois
Open Meetings Act has the word “and” placed between the phrase
“actions of public  bodies” and  “their deliberations,” and the word “or”
between the words “discussed” and “acted upon.”122  Thus, it would be
logical to infer that discussion is being talked about in a different sense
from action because of the conjunctions which separate these different
phrases. 
Looking at the placement of words to get the meaning of certain
words is a logical procedure, but the court fails to support its final
conclusion.123  After the court divided these sets of words into two
separate groups, it found “‘consideration of’ items not specifically set
forth in the agenda to be in the nature of deliberations and discussions
and not actions taken.”124  The decision to place “consideration” into
the category of discussion rather than action would be appropriate if the
Rice court gave a reason, but it did not do so.125 
One easy way to find a rationale would have been to look up the
word “consideration” in the dictionary and thereby give the term its
plain meaning.126  The American Heritage College Dictionary defines
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“consideration” as “[c]areful thought; deliberation.”127  Therefore, the
Rice court may have come to the correct conclusion as to the meaning
of “consideration,” but it did not defend this decision.  It could have
included even a simple dictionary definition to support its ultimate
conclusion.
However, by applying the rules of statutory interpretation in a
broader sense and carefully analyzing the actual purpose of the Illinois
Open Meetings Act, rather than determining the way certain words
should be categorized, the intent of the legislature would be satisfied
whether “consideration” is defined as action or discussion.  The
purpose of the Illinois Open Meetings Act is to keep the public
informed by requiring all discussions and actions of public  bodies take
place in the open.128  Thus, since the intent of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act will be fulfilled whether “consideration” is defined as
action or discussion, the Rice court’s argument does not have validity.
2.  The Agenda Item, New Business
Turning to the more important and controversial second issue in
Rice, the court decided whether the agenda item, New Business, was
specific enough to give notice to the public.129  Looking to the words of
the Illinois Open Meetings Act once again to determine the
legislature’s intent, the court declared that New Business did not give
enough advance notice to the public.130  Once again, however, the court
did not give any explanation as to why it came to this conclusion.131
Thus, when the court found that the item, New Business, did not provide
sufficient advance notice to the public, Rice would only be correct if it
based its decision on previous cases dealing with this type of catch-all
provision, like Redell, which held a similar agenda item to be too all-
inclusive to give enough notice to the public.132  
The problem with this argument, however, is that even though
precedent exists in Illinois cases to hold the item, New Business, does
not give enough advance notice to the public, holdings of Illinois
earlier cases imply that such an agenda item might be acceptable.  The
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Argo court required only that action by public bodies be germane to a
subject on the agenda.133  Germane is defined as appropriate, relative,
or in close relationship.134  In Argo, the school board’s agenda stated the
meeting would cover “‘[r]eview and discussion of salaries involving
administrators, supervisors and other personnel not covered by
agreements.’”135  The Argo court decided discussions of who can
consent to salary increases, who will secure a salary, and the length of
the superintendent's contract were related closely enough, or germane
to, a discussion of salaries of personnel not covered by agreements.136
In Argo, the school board listed a broad topic  on the agenda and then
took action on items that were more specific  but not expressly listed on
the agenda.137  The Argo court found this action to be appropriate and
in accordance with the rules set forth in the Illinois Open Meetings
Act.138  
The facts in Rice are very similar to those in Argo.139  The Rice
defendants also listed a broad term on the agenda in the form of the
item, New Business.140  When the board got down to this item on the
agenda, Mr. Heidbreder spoke of, and action was taken on, the
resolution dealing with the alternative benefit program for elected
county officials pursuant to section 7–145.1 of the Illinois Pension
Code.141  Applying the ruling in Argo to the facts in Rice, the only
question that would need to be asked is whether the alternative benefit
program for elected county officials is germane enough to the item,
New Business, listed on the agenda under which action was taken.142
With such a broad definition of germane to work with, the Rice court
could have easily decided that the alternative benefit program for
elected county officials was germane enough to the item, New Business.
Therefore, applying rules of statutory interpretation with a slightly
broader approach might have led the Rice court to rule the opposite way
and hold that the defendant’s agenda item, New Business, did give
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enough advance notice to the public  under the Illinois Open Meetings
Act.  
B.  Open Meetings vs. Good Business
What the Rice court undoubtedly forgot was the Illinois Open
Meetings Act’s second purpose, which is to aid public bodies in
carrying out their business in the manner most beneficial to the
public.143  In Gosnell v. Hogan, 144 the court decided “whether the Board
violated the [Illinois Open Meetings] Act by discussing during
executive session matters not excepted in the Act, and whether the
Board failed to comply with the formal requisites of the Act.”145  As the
Gosnell court pointed out, “[w]e recognize the delicate balance between
interpreting the Act too broadly, thereby running the risk that the public
interest will take second seat to the interest of private individuals, and
interpreting the Act too narrowly, thereby overwhelming the public
officials with time consuming formalities. . .  . ”146  It is not always
feasible for both of the above-stated goals of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act to be promoted at once.147  As the court noted, “where the
purposes of the Act cannot be promoted in harmony, priority should be
given to the more dominant or overriding purpose.”148  Here, the more
dominant purpose of the Illinois Open Meetings Act is the promotion
of good business.149
People ex rel. Hopf v. Barger150 concerned members of a municipal
body having a private conversation with their attorney.151  In
considering whether this conversation would be in violation of the
Illinois Open Meetings Act, the court reasoned:
The people's access to information is the basis of public understanding
of governmental decisions so that their elected representatives will be
responsive to them and under their ultimate control.  But disclosure of
all forms of information preliminary to decision-making may prevent
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the efficient administration of governmental functions and thus
adversely affect the public interest.152
  As Representative Murphy noted in the third reading of House Bill
1332, the Illinois Municipal Clerks, the Illinois Association of School
Administrators, the library districts, the City of Chicago, and the Cook
County Board of Commissioners were all against the amendment
which led to the conflicted issue in Rice because it took away freedom
to do business.153  If Rice is correct, “[c]ommunity members,
employees, and even board members themselves who introduce
requests for prompt action during board meetings may be disappointed
or frustrated by the delay, if their matter cannot be dealt with because
it was not on the official agenda.”154  
With respect to whether the term “consideration” is defined as
“discussion” or “action” in Rice, the first purpose of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act is fulfilled whether the court decides “consideration” is
just discussion or action because either way the “consideration” is open
to the public.155  The Illinois Open Meetings Act requires that both
action and discussion at any meetings be open.156  Since one purpose of
the Illinois Open Meetings Act had been fulfilled, the second purpose
of the Act should be examined to determine if it has been satisfied.
Regarding the item, New Business, the only requirement needing to
be met is giving advance notice to the public.157  Although only
persuasive, cases such as the First District of Illinois’ Argo possibly
c ould have reversed the thinking of the Rice court judges.158  Since the
court could conceivably have held the opposite way from the
perspective of the first purpose of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, it
seems logical to once again look to the second purpose of the Act to
see whether it has been fulfilled.
When applying the business purpose of the Illinois Open Meetings
Act to the issues of whether “consideration” should mean “taking
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action,” and whether New Business should be an appropriate agenda
item, the analysis is the same.  All that needs to be asked is whether
allowing “consideration” to mean taking action and allowing New
Business to be an appropriate item on an agenda helps public bodies
carry out their business.  The answer is undoubtedly yes, for reasons of
efficiency.  A comparison can be made to the Congress of the United
States of America.  When one political party has the majority in both
the U.S House and Senate, more bills are passed and generally more
things are accomplished because the two parts of Congress are working
together as a team.159  However, when one political party rules the U.S.
House and another political party rules the U.S. Senate, the Congress
as a whole is not as efficient in bill passing because the two parties are
usually fighting against each other.160  The same concept can be applied
to a public  body in Illinois trying to get something done at some type
of board meeting.  The more restrictions on how and when action can
be taken, the less they will be able to accomplish because those
restrictions act as an opponent to business efficiency.  On the other
hand, if everyone was working on the same team and the Rice court had
decided that “consideration” can mean taking action, and the item New
Business on the agenda is appropriate to give enough advance notice to
the public, the overriding business purpose of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act would be fulfilled much more easily.
C.  Substantial Compliance
The Rice court could have also relied on the notion of substantial
compliance to side with the defendants.  The Illinois Open Meetings
Act requires only that a public  body substantially comply with its
provisions.161  Thus, if the Rice court would have taken the view that the
defendants substantially complied with the provisions of the Illinois
Open Meetings Act when they used the agenda item, New Business, then
the judgment might have been different.
In Williamson v. Doyle,162 a special city council meeting was
c ommenced on July 9, 1981.163  At this meeting, Ordinance No.
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0–12–81 was recommended and adopted.164  Ordinance No. 0–12–81
was identical to, and was in effect a re-enactment of, the previous
Ordinance No. 0–8–81, adopted at the regular meeting on May 12,
1981.165  A question arose whether notice was given for the July 9,
1981, special meeting.166  The plaintiffs introduced affidavits by six
persons saying that they attended the meeting of July 9, 1981, and
“they did not see notices of the special meeting posted at the city hall.
As against this, the city clerk testified that the posting of notices posed
a problem since on some occasions notices had been removed without
authority.”167  In the court’s ruling it stated, “we are impelled to classify
this type of violation as inconsequential and strictly technical.  In our
opinion, the law was substantially complied with.”168
A court could reasonably conclude the defendants in Rice
substantially complied with the provisions of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act.  The board did have an agenda posted for the meeting.169
The board even had the term, New Business, listed on the agenda to
show there was a possibility that something new might come up that
called for action at that particular meeting.170  The court found in the
record other agendas dated September 8, 1998, and October 13, 1998,
which were, in appearance, nearly identical to the agenda in question.171
Thus, the public  had been given notice at least two months prior that
New Business might be a possible item on the agenda.172  Mr. Heidbreder
did not just stand up at a random time during the meeting and state,
“there is another resolution present.”173  He did so when the meeting
had gotten down to New Business on the agenda.174  The Rice defendants
took many steps to provide that notice would be given to the public.175
Therefore, the Rice court could have ruled in favor of the defendants if
they applied the notion of substantial compliance.
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D.  The Future
Taking all these factors into consideration, even if justification
could be found in favor of the Rice court’s ruling, future problems may
still arise because of the court’s lack of discussion behind its reasoning.
The legislature gave Illinois an Open Meetings Act that undoubtedly
contained some ambiguity.176  Thus, the job of the court should be to
interpret the legislature and give the people of the State of Illinois as
much help as possible in determining what they can and cannot do
under the Act.  The Rice opinion consists of approximately three
pages.177  Perhaps the court should have spent a little bit more time
explaining its rationale to help avoid future confusion in cases dealing
with similar issues.  The Rice court’s failure to provide reasoning
creates uncertainty and will lead to additional litigation, in addition to
possible legislative inefficiency.  This missed opportunity will
undoubtedly lead to delays and loss of money as Illinois public  bodies
have to hold extra meetings for issues that arise but are not on the
posted agenda.
One question Rice does not answer is whether a public body can
take action on items in emergency meetings and, if so, what procedures
should be followed.  Section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act
does suggest that notice of an emergency meeting needs to be given “as
soon as practicable.”178  The Illinois Open Meetings Act is not clear as
to whether an agenda is needed for an emergency meeting, however.179
In the May 2002 Law Pulse edition of the Illinois Bar Journal, one
practitioner advised, “the public body might end its regular meeting
and announce that an emergency meeting will be convened in order to
take the needed action.”180  The 1973 Illinois Appellate Court case,
Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Karn,181 involved an emergency
meeting in which the plaintiff’s board of directors adopted a resolution
to construct the East-West Extension of the Northern Illinois Toll
Highway.182  The plaintiff posted a copy of the notice of this November
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27 emergency meeting on the main bulletin board of its principal office
in Oak Brook, Illinois, and supplied copies to all local newspapers and
to other news media which had requested it.183  The court held this
notice to be sufficient.184  The agenda requirement of the Illinois Open
Meetings Act did not come into being until 1995.185  Karn was decided
in 1973.186  Thus, Karn would not totally clear up the post-Rice dilemma
of whether an emergency meeting requires an agenda, but it does
provide a small safety net for public bodies in Illinois who hold such
a meeting without an agenda.
The true answer to the question of whether a public body can hold
an emergency meeting without an agenda may be found by looking to
jurisdictions other than Illinois.  Although only persuasive, Eastwold v.
Garsaud187 revolves around an open meeting statute with similar
language to that of Illinois’ Open Meeting Act.188  Both states’
Sunshine Laws require an agenda for regular meetings of public
bodies.189  Section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act
contemplates that notice of emergency meetings should be given “as
soon as practicable.”190  The notice section of the Louisiana Open
Meetings Act191 provides notice of an emergency meeting should be
given as the public  body “deems appropriate and circumstances
permit.”192  An agenda is one way to give notice of a meeting.  The
Eastwold court held, “the posting of the notice without the agenda in
two locations in the city hall” was sufficient for the emergency meeting
in controversy.193  Applying this persuasive ruling to Illinois would
suggest that public  bodies might not need to have an agenda for
emergency meeting in order to comply with the requirements of the
Illinois Open Meetings Act.  
Another question that may arise as a result of the ruling in Rice is
w hether final action on an item not specifically addressed in the regular
meeting agenda can be taken in an open meeting after a closed
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session.194  In Gosnell, the court held that the Illinois Open Meetings Act
did not require notice in the agenda of topics to be considered in closed
session.195  The court noted only subjects specified in the vote to close
may be considered during the closed session.196  
What the court did not discuss, which now becomes a question after
the ruling in Rice is whether a public  body can vote in open session on
something discussed in closed session.  The Illinois Open Meetings Act
prohibits “final action” in a closed session.197  For example, in Jewell v.
Board of Ed.,198 the plaintiff, Sue Jewell, was employed by the
defendant, the Board of Education of Community Unit School District
No. 300, Perry County, Illinois, as a guidance counselor.199  On March
25, 1971, the defendant board went into closed session to talk about
whether or not the plaintiff would be rehired.200  The board
unanimously decided the plaintiff should not be rehired and prepared
a motion in accordance with this conclusion.201  Upon returning to open
session, a roll call vote was taken and the motion not to rehire the
plaintiff passed.202  
In Jewell, the issue was whether the motion prepared in closed
session violated the Illinois Open Meetings Act rule about not taking
final action in closed session.203  The reason the legislature wanted final
action taken in public, logically, can be linked to the first purpose of
the Illinois Open Meetings Act requiring public bodies to conduct their
deliberations and take their actions openly.204  In fact, the true
legislative intent was to allow closed meetings only when absolutely
necessary for this very reason.205  The Jewell court ruled that making the
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motion was not final action and, thus, not in violation of the Illinois
Open Meetings Act.206  However, the issue of whether the roll call vote
would be allowed under the Illinois Open Meetings Act because it was
not placed on the agenda was not raised. 207  Once again, the agenda
requirement of the Illinois Open Meetings Act was not enacted until
1995, and this case was decided in 1974.208  Thus, this explains the lack
of such an issue in the case.  However, very few Illinois cases after the
1995 amendment deal with the issue of whether a public body can vote
in open session on an item discussed in closed session but not
specific ally addressed in the meeting’s agenda.  As a result of the
ruling in Rice, subsequent courts might have to decide this very
important new question.  
The Illinois legislature could lessen the confusion over Rice by
amending the Illinois Open Meetings Act to define “consideration.”
This is unlikely to occur, however because Illinois courts recognize the
legislature would be unable to predict every conceivable interpretation
of a statute and codify the language of those numerous
interpretations.209  As the court in People ex rel. Difanis v. Barr210 stated:
No law can be so clear and extensive that it will provide in advance for
all cases  that may arise. We must tolerate at least a modicum of
ambiguity and uncertainty, because the prescience of even the most
ingenious drafters is  finite. The human imagination is limited, and the
variety of circumstances great: the meaning of a statute is honed on the
cases that are not anticipated but do arise.211
Until the Illinois legislature decides to clarify the Illinois Open
Meetings Act or another Illinois court overrules  Rice, the notice
standards set forth by Rice’s holding are what public bodies in Illinois
must tolerate.  After all, any person who violates any provision of the
Illinois Open Meetings Act is guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.212
Thus, as the Illinois Association of School Boards recently suggested
in its March, 2002, News Bulletin, public bodies in Illinois “should
limit board action to published agenda topics.”213  It is better to be safe
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than sorry.  Even though the Rice court’s ruling may make Illinois
public  bodies’ jobs harder, it is now the law of the land until further
notice.   
V.  CONCLUSION
Since its inception, the ambiguity encompassed in the Illinois
Sunshine Laws has led to uncertainty concerning the level of notice
public  bodies need to give the public  for meetings.  Illinois courts
should take the lead in trying to clear up some of the confusion
involving this rather important administrative statute.  However, rather
than helping to resolve some of the remaining questions about the
Illinois Open Meetings Act, the Rice court ac tually seems to add a few
of its own.  Instead of shedding light on the notice requirements set out
in section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, the Rice court
conversely creates a large shadow.  
The township board meeting is finally winding down after a long
night of debate.214  The board supervisor as chairman of trustees
courageously asks, “Is there any New Business?”  The female member
of the crowd jumps up and proposes the board should vote that the
township be sprayed for mosquitoes that carry the West Nile Virus.
The chairman confers with the rest of the board, and after some
discussion with the audience makes a motion that a vote should be
taken on the mosquito spraying matter.  The motion is seconded.  The
vote is taken.  The issue passes by a majority vote of the township
board, and a committee is formed to accept bids for the planned
spraying of the mosquitoes.  
The result in this situation is the ideal outcome for any public
body’s meeting in Illinois.  Public officials are in office to serve the
public.  Both the public and public officials want matters to be resolved
as quickly and as pain-free as possible.  Unfortunately, due to the Rice
court ruling, the happy ending depicted above will most likely become
a trend of the past.  
If the Rice court had given more reasoning supporting its decision
perhaps public officials in Illinois would have a better understanding
of the notice requirements of the Illinois Open Meetings Act.  Instead,
by applying narrow rules of statutory interpretation, the Rice court lays
down its ruling without much discussion about why it did so.  By
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looking at those same principles of statutory interpretation more
broadly and considering other factors such as public business
efficiency, substantial compliance with the Illinois Open Meetings Ac t,
and future problems, it is apparent the exact opposite ruling would have
been more fitting.  A public body’s agenda item, New Business, should
be allowed to stand as giving enough advance notice for new issues
presented for the first time at meetings.  In addition, in the context of
section 2.02(a) of the Illinois Open Meetings Act, the term,
“consideration,” should not only include discussing agenda items, but
also taking action on them.  
  
